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I. INTRODUCTION 
Before criticizing President Reagan's recent nominations of con-
servative judges to the Supreme Court, one should note a recent 
Supreme Court decision1 authored by Justice Scalia, a Reagan ap-
pointee. Those who fear that a conservative shift in the Court will 
lead to the erosion of individual liberties gained under the Warren 
Court may well find their fears unfounded. In Arizona v. Hicks,2 
Justice Scalia proves that once a nominee joins the Supreme Court, 
there is no way to predict with certainty how he or she will vote on 
a given issue. 
In Arizona v. Hicks, the Supreme Court held that probable cause 
is required to invoke the "plain view" doctrine for even cursory in-
spections.3 This decision, which hinders law enforcement and breaks 
with accepted practice, was authored by Justice Scalia. This Note 
criticizes Justice Scalia's failure to exempt cursory inspections from 
the probable cause requirement. 
I I . HISTORY OF THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE 
The "plain view" doctrine permits the warrantless seizure of evi-
dence inadvertently discovered by police who are lawfully in a posi-
tion to view the item.4 This exception to the warrant requirement is 
based on the notion that once police are lawfully in a position to 
observe an item, its owner no longer has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.5 
Prior to Arizona v. Hicks, the Supreme Court had not directly 
addressed the issue of whether probable cause is required to invoke 
the "plain view" doctrine. However, decisions rendered by the 
Court lead lower courts to develop the "plain view" doctrine in two 
distinct directions: full-blown searches requiring probable cause, 
and cursory inspections requiring only reasonable suspicion.6 
The evolution of this dual standard began with Justice Stewart's 
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concurring opinion in Stanley v. Georgia.'1 His opinion makes a dis-
tinction between a full-blown search and "mere inspection" when 
applying the "plain view" doctrine, implying that mere inspection 
should be held to a lower standard. Justice Stewart's rationale for 
the distinction is that a mere inspection is not prone to the same 
abuses as a full-blown search.8 
The distinction further evolved in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.9 
The Coolidge plurality stated that the "plain view" justification is 
not applicable unless it is immediately apparent that the object is 
contraband or evidence of a crime.10 The Court, however, offered no 
guidance, leaving the interpretation of "immediately apparent" to 
the lower courts.11 
Because Stanley hinted that a mere inspection should be held to 
a lower standard than a full-blown search, and the Supreme Court 
did not address the issue in Coolidge, an overwhelming majority of 
both state and federal courts have held that a standard less than 
probable cause can justify a cursory inspection.12 The following pas-
sage is typical of the position adopted by most lower courts: 
"the minimal additional intrusion which results from an inspection or 
examination of an object in plain view is reasonable if the officer was 
first aware of some facts and circumstances which justify a reasonable 
suspicion (not probable cause, in the traditional sense) that the object 
is or contains a fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of a crime."1 3 
Two Supreme Court cases furthered the distinction between a 
full-blown search and a cursory inspection. The first, Texas v. 
Brown,14 reasoned that a full-blown search of an item in plain view 
must be based on probable cause, but the mere observation of such 
an item generally does not involve a fourth amendment search.16 
The second case, United States v. Place,16 extended "stop and 
frisk"17 principles to items of personal property, permitting a brief 
search and seizure of those items based on a reasonable suspicion 
that an item contains contraband or evidence of a crime.18 
Thus, case law leading up to Arizona v. Hicks generally recog-
nized that under the "plain view" doctrine police could conduct a 
full-blown search of items found in plain view if based on probable 
7 394 U.S. 557, 571 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
8 Id. at 571. 
9 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
10 Id. at 466. 
11 2 W . LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6 . 7 ( b ) , at 7 1 7 (2d ed. 1 9 8 7 ) . Interpreted 
strictly, the "immediately apparent" standard would bar any examination of an article 
that would extend beyond the reason for the officer's presence on the premises. But as 
Professor LaFave points out, most courts have not taken such a narrow view. Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. See, e.g., People v. Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 
1970). See also, State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 343 N.W.2d 391 (Wis. 1984). 
14 460 U.S. 730 (1983). 
18 See generally id. at 736-44. 
16 462 U.S. 692 (1983). 
17 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). 
18 Place, 462 U.S. at 702. 
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cause. Further, police could conduct a cursory inspection of such 
items on less than probable cause. In Hicks, the Supreme Court 
squarely addressed whether probable cause is required to invoke the 
"plain view" doctrine and whether there are different standards for 
full-blown searches and cursory inspections. 
III. Arizona v. Hicks 
A. Facts and Case History 
The defendant fired a gun through the floor of his apartment in-
juring a man below. Based on the exigency of the circumstances, 
police officers made a warrantless search of the defendant's apart-
ment to look for the source of the bullet, possible other victims, and 
weapons.19 
During the search, one of the officers noticed two sets of expen-
sive stereo components in plain view. The stereo equipment was of a 
type frequently stolen and seemed out of place in the otherwise ill-
furnished apartment. In addition, the apartment was littered with 
drug paraphernalia, a .45-caliber automatic pistol, a .22-caliber 
sawed-off rifle, and a stocking mask. Suspecting that the equipment 
had been stolen, the officer read and recorded the serial numbers. 
In order to read the numbers, the officer had to move a stereo turn-
table a few inches. The officer then reported the serial number, and 
after being advised that the turntable had been stolen in an armed 
robbery, he immediately seized it.20 
At the defendant's armed robbery trial, the trial court granted 
his motion to suppress the stolen equipment. The Arizona Court of 
Appeals affirmed, concluding that, although the initial intrusion 
was valid, obtaining the serial number was an additional search, 
unrelated to the exigency. The United States Supreme Court, in an 
opinion written by Justice Scalia, affirmed the Arizona Court of 
Appeals.21 
B. United States Supreme Court 
The Court held that probable cause is required to invoke the 
"plain view" doctrine and refused to adopt a distinction between a 
full-blown search and a cursory inspection, stating that "[a] search 
is a search."22 However, the Court did note that a truly cursory 
inspection of an item in plain view is not a fourth amendment 
search and that the mere recording of serial numbers does not con-
stitute a seizure.23 In this case, the officer moved the turntable a 
19 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1152-55. 
22 Id. at 1153. 
23 Id. at 1152. 
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few inches and the State conceded the lack of probable cause. 
Therefore, the Court found that the officer's actions constituted an 
illegal search and seizure.24 
The Court reasoned that had the officers known that the stolen 
stereo equipment was in the defendant's apartment, they would 
have been required to obtain a warrant based upon probable cause 
in order to seize the equipment.25 Under the facts of Hicks, the 
Court found no reason to allow a search or seizure without probable 
cause since probable cause would have been necessary had the of-
ficers known that the equipment was in the apartment.26 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Search Was Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment 
In Hicks, the entry into the defendant's apartment was justified 
by the exigent circumstances. Once lawfully inside, the officers were 
justified in searching the entire apartment for the source of the bul-
let, weapons, and possible other victims. Finding the stolen stereo 
equipment was not the result of a general search, but rather an 
inadvertent discovery. The equipment was discovered in "plain 
view" and thus, the search was reasonable under the fourth 
amendment. 
B. The "Bright Line" Approach is Too Rigid 
The Court eliminates the distinction between a full-blown search 
and a cursory inspection, stating that "a search is a search."27 
Thus, probable cause is required for all "plain view" searches, re-
gardless of their intrusiveness. The Court ignores, however, that it 
has long recognized that searches vary in intrusiveness28 and that it 
has adopted standards of reasonableness (less than probable cause) 
when a careful balancing of governmental and individual interests 
suggest such a standard is appropriate.29 Therefore, the Court's 
"bright line" approach is inappropriate because it does not consider 
distinctions in the level of intrusiveness. Such an approach does not 
follow the Court's previous cases, nor the spirit of the fourth 
amendment. 
Probable cause should be required for a full-blown search of an 
item in plain view in order to prevent a general search. However, by 
its very nature, a cursory inspection is minimally intrusive and lim-
ited in scope. By demanding that cursory inspections also be based 
24 Id. at 1153-54. 
25 Id. 
28 Id. at 1154. 
27 Id. at 1153. 
28 Id. at 1159 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
29 Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 649 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)). 
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upon probable cause, the Court has extended the fourth amendment 
beyond its original purpose. Clearly, a cursory inspection is not a 
general search and thus, should not require probable cause. 
Although a "bright line" approach may be desirable, the facts of 
Hicks demonstrate that such an approach is often too rigid.30 For 
example, had the serial number been on the front of the turntable, 
exposed to the officer, the Court stated that there would not have 
been an illegal search.31 But because the serial number happened to 
be facing the wall and the officer had to move the turntable a few 
inches, the Court held that the search was illegal.32 By openly dis-
playing the turntable in his living room, however, the defendant did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.33 The defendant did 
not face the serial number toward the wall to hide or conceal any-
thing. Rather, the manufacturer just happened to stamp the serial 
number on the back of the turntable. Therefore, the fourth amend-
ment should not have prohibited the cursory inspection of the 
turntable. 
C. The Decision Will Unduly Hamper Law Enforcement 
Under the Hicks decision, law enforcement officers are not al-
lowed to move an item in plain view without probable cause. Such a 
limitation will greatly hamper law enforcement efforts and unduly 
inconvenience the police. For example, under the facts of Hicks, the 
police would need to leave the defendant's apartment and continue 
a separate investigation until they established probable cause to be-
lieve the turntable was contraband or evidence of a crime, and then 
obtain a warrant.34 By allowing a brief cursory inspection of the 
turntable, the follow-up investigation and inconvenience would be 
eliminated.36 
Finally, serial numbers are often the only identifying feature on 
mass produced items. Therefore, from a practical standpoint, a cur-
sory inspection is not only helpful, but often necessary. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia's opinion in Hicks unreasonably restricts the "plain 
view" doctrine. By refusing to acknowledge a distinction between a 
full-blown search and a cursory inspection, the Court places serious 
30 This rigid approach may lead lower courts to relax the probable cause standard in 
order to permit cursory inspections. For example, had the State not conceded the lack of 
probable cause in this case, a lower court could easily have found, as Justice O'Connor 
did, that probable cause existed. Id. at 1160. 
31 Id. at 1152. 
32 Id. 
33 See, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
34 Once the police leave, their subsequent intrusion would no longer be justified by exi 
gent circumstances. Therefore, they would need a warrant. 
38 Furthermore, the investigation delay may result in the destruction of evidence. 
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roadblocks in the way of effective law enforcement without any sig-
nificant enhancement of individual privacy interests. Thus, Hicks 
imposes a high cost for a de minimus benefit. 
